We develop a competitive pricing model which combines the complexity of time-varying demand and cost functions and that of scale economies arising from dynamic lot sizing costs. Each firm can replenish inventory in each of the T periods into which the planning horizon is partitioned. Fixed as well as variable procurement costs are incurred for each procurement order, along with inventory carrying costs. Each firm adopts, at the beginning of the planning horizon, a (single) price to be employed throughout the horizon. Based on each period's system of demand equations, these prices determine a time series of demands for each firm, which needs to service them with an optimal corresponding dynamic lot sizing plan. We establish the existence of a price equilibrium and associated optimal dynamic lotsizing plans, under mild conditions. We also design efficient procedures to compute the equilibrium prices and dynamic lotsizing plans.
Introduction
Determining the 'right' price to charge for a product is a complex task. A voluminous literature in economics and marketing has been devoted to models which prescribe how prices should be set in industries in which a limited number of competing firms offer similar products, which may therefore be viewed as substitutes. These papers typically model the interaction among competitors as a noncooperative game, see Vives (2000) and Tirole (1988) for survey texts.
More recently, operations management papers have demonstrated that the operational environment and associated cost structures may have a fundamental impact on the equilibrium behavior in the industry, in general, and the resulting price levels in particular. See Cachon (2003) for a recent survey. Little remains known, however, about how prices should be set in a competitive environment, in the simultaneous presence of two other major complications:
(i) time dependent demand functions and cost parameters, and
(ii) scale economies in the operational costs.
In contrast, progress has been made in addressing either one of these factors by itself. For example, Bernstein and Federgruen (2003) address a setting where each firm incurs fixed as well as variable procurement costs along with (linear) inventory carrying costs. However, the model assumes an infinite horizon setting with time-invariant demand functions and cost parameters.
Here the long-run average operational costs are given by the simple closed-form Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) cost function, i.e. the costs are given by the sum of a term that is proportional to the demand value itself and one that is proportional with the square root of the demand value, thus reflecting scale economies. Cachon and Harker (2002) similarly consider, for an industry with two firms, a setting with a single set of time-invariant demand functions and with a closed form cost function given by a concave power function of the demand volume, (possibly in conjunction with a linear cost component), once again to reflect scale economies. Other than the EOQ-cost model above, the authors show that their cost structure arises in a specific service competition model. The only oligopoly models with stochastic demands avoid both complications (i) and (ii), see e.g. Bernstein and Federgruen (2004) .
A stream of marketing papers addresses competitive pricing problems under time-dependent demand functions, however with simple linear cost functions, and under the assumption that each period's demand is procured in the same period, i.e. no inventories are carried. These papers include Kalish (1983) , Eliashberg and Jeuland (1986) , Clarke and Dolan (1984) , Rao and Bass (1985) , and Dockner and Jorgensen (1988) . See Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) for a survey. Sood (2003, 2004 ) and Kachani, Perakis and Simon (2004) also address competitive pricing problems under time-varying demand functions. Since each firm starts the planning horizon with a known inventory and inventories cannot be replenished at any time during the horizon, these models consider no replenishment costs. This paper appears to develop the first competitive pricing model which combines the complexity of time-varying demand and cost functions and that of scale economies arising from dynamic lot sizing costs. Each firm can replenish inventory in each of the T periods into which the planning horizon is partitioned. Fixed as well as variable procurement costs are incurred for each procurement order, along with inventory carrying costs. Each firm adopts, at the beginning of the planning horizon, a (single) price to be employed throughout the horizon. Based on each period's system of demand equations, these prices determine a time series of demands for each firm, which needs to service them with an optimal corresponding dynamic lot sizing plan. Scale economies always create major analytical complications in the study of price equilibria, see e.g. Vives (2000) and Cachon and Harker (2002) . In our case, the problems are compounded by the fact that the cost structure can not be represented as a closed form analytical function of the (time series of) demand volume(s). We model each firm's time dependent demand function as a time invariant function multiplied by a firm-and period-dependent 'seasonality' factor. In §6, we generalize our results to allow for additive seasonality terms.
We establish, under mild conditions, the existence of a price equilibrium and associated optimal dynamic lotsizing plans. We also design efficient procedures to compute the equilibrium prices and dynamic lotsizing plans. Finally, we characterize how the equilibrium is affected by changes in various cost and demand function parameters. Much of the analysis focuses on an individual firm's best response problem, i.e. the characterization of the optimal price and lot sizing strategy, in response to a given set of prices adopted by the firm's competitors. This best response problem is of interest in its own right. For the case of constant, but firm dependent, setup costs, we design an efficient algorithm whose computational effort involves O(T 2 ) elementary operations and O(T ) maximizations of a single variable concave function. (For many classes of demand functions, these maximizations can be performed in closed form). For the generalized model in §6, with additive seasonality terms and time-dependent setup costs, the recent O(T 3 log T ) procedure by van den Heuvel and Wagelsmans (2004) can be used.) The algorithm for the best response problem is used repeatedly when computing the overall price and lotsizing equilibrium in the industry.
We also conduct a numerical study, which, among others, reveals the following insights: contrary to folklore, it is not always best for a firm to operate under time-invariant demand functions or cost parameters. Even in equilibrium, all firms in the industry may be better off under certain types of seasonality patterns in the demand or cost parameters. When the above mild existence conditions for a (unique) equilibrium fail to hold, the industry may switch from having a unique equilibrium to either having none or multiple equilibria, depending on which seasonality pattern prevails.
One of the most fundamental assumptions in our model is that each firm maintains a constant price throughout the season. In many industries this is the practice, either because mid-season price changes can not be implemented (e.g. catalog sales) or because they are managerially undesirable.
For example, in many retail operations it is considered unacceptable to raise prices during the season and at most one or two markdowns in a single season are as much as contemplated. Empirical analysis has documented that prices for certain goods are extremely 'sticky', i.e. they change very slowly over time, if at all. Carlton (1986), for example, has investigated price data for industrial buyers over a 10 year period and has concluded that the price rigidity in many industries is striking. Kashyap (1995) analyzed the data from catalog sales and observed that the prices typically remain constant over several seasons, beyond the total of a year. As a third example, Cecchetti (1986) has studied newsstand prices for some 40 American magazines over a period of close to 20 years. This author concluded that prices exhibited remarkable rigidity to the extent of dropping in real (i.e. Beyond the competition models mentioned above, we now give a brief literature review. Even within the context of optimization models with a single decision maker, the integration of pricing and inventory strategies has only recently received the attention it deserves, even though the seminal papers on dynamic lot sizing by Wagner and Whitin (1958, 1959) and Wagner (1960) , 45 years ago, already addressed the need to integrate pricing and production planning decisions. We refer to Eliashberg and Steinberg (1993) for a survey of early work and to Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) for a more recent survey. Thomas (1970) addressed the dynamic lot sizing problem in which each period's demand depends (exclusively) on the price charged during this period according to a period-specific demand function. Assuming prices can be changed arbitrarily from one period to the next and that demand in a given period is independent of the prices offered in other periods, the author shows that an optimal plan can be found by a simple extension of the classical shortest path method by Wagner and Whitin (1958): As in the classical dynamic lot sizing problem with exogeneously specified demands, it is easily verified that replenishment orders should only be placed in periods with zero starting inventory. In view of this observation, the optimal procurement plan can thus again be described as the shortest path in a network in which each period is represented as a node and traversing an arc from period i to period j corresponds to the decision to satisfy all demands in period i, i + 1, . . . , j − 1 from a single order delivered in period i. The only difference with the classical Wagner-Whitin shortest path procedure is that evaluation of the (optimal) cost or profit value of any arc (i, j) now involves optimizing a closed form expression over the prices in periods i, i + 1, . . . , j − 1. Thus, dynamic lot sizing problems with arbitrary time-dependent prices are radically simpler than under the requirement that a single constant price be used.
Kunreuther and Schrage (1973) were the first to address the best response problem, indeed for the generalized model in §6. These authors propose a heuristic procedure which also generates an upper and lower bound for the optimal price. Van den Heuvel and Wagelsmans (2004) developed an O(T 3 log T ) algorithm, based on Kunreuther and Schrage's heuristic. Gilbert (1999) considers the special case of the best response problem in which all cost parameters remain constant over the entire planning horizon. Our procedure for the best response problem is based on Gilbert's approach but reduces the computational complexity by an order of magnitude (O(T 2 ) compared to O(T 3 ) complexity), while addressing more general parameter settings. This complexity reduction is particularly important in our competition model where best response problems need to be solved repeatedly and for each of the N firms in the industry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In §2 we specify the competition model and the notation. §3 is devoted to the best response problem. The equilibrium analysis for the competitive model is carried out in §4. §5 reports on a numerical study, while §6 discusses conclusions and various generalizations of the model.
Model and Notation
We consider an industry with N firms, each selling a distinct item or product brand. We refer to the item sold by firm i as item i = 1, . . . , N. The different items are (close) substitutes of each other, e.g. different brands of 19" television sets, digital cameras, notebook computers, sport utility vehicles, tooth paste etc. We consider a planning horizon of T periods. If the firms face a natural sales season introducing a new model or variant in each season, a natural choice of T arises, e.g. T = 52 weeks in the automobile manufacturing industry operating with a weekly production and sales schedule. 
Multiplicative seasonality factors characterize the demand functions' time dependence:
with δ i (p) the deseasonalized demand function for firm i, i = 1, . . . , N. Depending on the period's seasonality factor, a firm's demand is, in a given period, scaled up (β i t > 1) or down (β i t < 1) compared to the deseasonalized norm. Without loss of generality, we normalize the seasonality factors such that:
(In §6, we discuss generalizations of (1), with additive seasonality terms.)
The deseasonalized functions δ i (p) are continuously differentiable, with 
Without loss of generality, we assume that the Dominant Diagonal condition applies:
It merely precludes completely unrealistic situations where an across the board price increase in the industry results in an increase of a firm's sales volume. The Cobb-Douglas functions represent another important class of demand functions:
b i is the absolute elasticity of firm i's demand with respect to its own price, while θ i j denotes the cross elasticity with respect to competitor j's price. Under the Cobb-Douglas structure, these price elasticities are therefore constant, i.e. independent of the price levels.
The firms procure their goods by a production and distribution process which, in principle, allows for inventory replenishments at the beginning of each period. As in standard dynamic lot sizing problems, we assume that fixed as well as variable procurement costs are incurred as well as inventory carrying costs which are proportional to each end-of-the-period inventory. All cost 
C i (p) = the minimum total operating costs for firm i to service the demand stream {d i t (p)}. The difficulty in analyzing the competition model and in characterizing its equilibrium behavior, 
Proof: Fix a price vector p ∈ R N . Assume firm i chooses to replenish its inventory in the set of periods Θ = {t 1 = 1, t 2 , . . . , t n }. It is well known that a Zero-Inventory Ordering (ZIO) policy is optimal, so the optimal cost under this sequence of order periods is given by:
where Firm i's best response problem, given his competitors' prices p −i , can then be formulated as:
The best response problem under constant setup costs
In this §, we analyze a given firm i's best response problem (8) in the important special case where its setup cost remains constant across time
= K i , so that, for any sequence of order periods Θ = {t, . . . , t n } with n setup periods (see (7)):
where F i n (t) = minimum total variable procurement and holding costs in periods {1, . . . , t} for (11) firm i, when exactly n orders are placed in the first t periods, assuming the firm's demand stream is given by the seasonality factors β i 1 , . . . , β i t and assuming only ZIO policies are considered; t = 1, . . . , T ; n = 1, . . . , t, i = 1, . . . , N.
Since the overall optimal replenishment strategy for firm i, under any price vector p, employs Zero Inventory Ordering (ZIO), we may, in the definition of F i n (t), confine ourselves to such strategies as well. Also, since F i n (t) is the minimum cost in a dynamic lot sizing problem with zero fixed order costs, we may, in the definition of F i n (t) replace the requirement that exactly n orders be placed, by the (relaxed) requirement that at most n orders be placed.
The representation of the minimum total cost as the minimum of T affine functions of δ i (p) was first obtained by Gilbert (1999) , for the special case where all cost parameters remain constant.
Gilbert proceeds to compute the numbers {F
In the next subsection we develop an O(T 2 ) procedure to compute the matrix of values
. . , T . Thus, assuming these values have been determined, it follows from (3) that the best response problem (8) reduces to:
In other words, the best response problem reduces to T maximization problems of a concave
is strictly decreasing and has an inverse function R i
T |p −i . Substituting this demand value into (12), we conclude that the solution of the best response problem reduces to the determination of T closed form expressions (for n = 1, . . . , T ) involving the inverse derivative revenue function 
, giving rise to a quadratic revenue function R i (·|p −i ) and an optimal deseasonalized demand volume, given n orders, of
and a corresponding price
Substituting this value into (12), we obtain:
a closed form expression in terms of the values
, F i T (T ) . Example 2:
Assume the demand functions are of the Cobb-Douglas type in (5). Thus, (16) so that δ * i (n),the optimal deseasonalized demand volume, given a total of n orders during he planning horizon, is the value of δ i which maximizes the concave function T (δ i )
and after some algebra,
The multiplicative form of the expression for δ * i (n) shows that, given any number of orders n, the percentage change in the optimal deseasonalized demand value or the optimal price, due to any change in the seasonality pattern, holding and variable order cost rates, is independent of what prices are offered by the competing firms. The smaller the absolute price elasticity, the more the seasonality pattern or any of the variable cost rates impact on both the optimal (deseasonalized) demand value and profit level.
Before developing an efficient algorithm to compute the values {F i n (T ) : n = 1 . . . , T }, we first establish several important structural properties of these values.
Theorem 1 In a lotsizing problem with a horizon of T periods and constant setup costs, let z(n) denote the minimum cost if at most n order periods are used. z(n) is decreasing and convex.
Proof: Letz(n) denote the minimum cost among all strategies, which place exactly n orders, not necessarily in distinct periods, and let σ(n) denote the optimal strategy which achieves the cost valuez(n). (To fulfill the requirement that exactly n orders are to be placed, it may be optimal to place multiple orders in the same period, even though additional orders in any given period fail to be beneficial.) We show thatz(n) is convex. This implies that an integer 1 ≤ n * ≤ T exists such thatz (n) >z(n + 1) ∀n < n * (19) For all n ≤ n * , σ(n) places orders in n distinct periods. (If for some n ≤ n * , σ(n) places multiple orders in the same period, a strategy σ with cost value z <z(n) can be obtained, which places (n − 1) orders, such thatz(n − 1) ≤ z <z(n), contradicting (19) .). Thus: (20) By (19) , z(n) is decreasing and convex ifz(n) is convex.
To show the latter, it suffices to show, for all n 1 , n 2 
. . , t n 1 +n 2 } denote the set of order periods employed by the strategy σ which achieves the minimum cost valuez(n 1 + n 2 ) among all strategies employing (n 1 + n 2 ) orders.
Let σ denote the modified strategy, under which the last (n 2 − 1) orders in Θ are eliminated and all demands in periods {t n 1 +1 + 1, . . . , T } are procured in period t n 1 +1 and let z denote its cost value. Similarly, let z denote the cost of the ZIO strategy which employs the n 2 order periods {1, t n 1 +2 , . . . , t n 1 +n 2 }. Note that:
The first inequality is immediate since σ is one feasible strategy employing n 1 + 1 orders. To verify the second inequality, let for all 1 ≤ s < t ≤ T : Note that:
since, otherwise, a cost reduction could be achieved by moving the entire order at time t +1 forward to period t , as an additional order beyond the order(s) already scheduled for that period. This would contradict the optimality of the strategy σ. Thus, with t n 1 +n 2 +1 = T :
, where the first inequality follows from (22) , the second equality from (21) and the last inequality from the fact that z is the cost of some feasible strategy employing n 2 orders, whilez(n 2 ) is the minimum cost among all such strategies.
Since F i n (t) represents the cost value of a dynamic lot sizing problem with constant, in fact zero, setup costs, it follows that the values F i n (t) : n = 1, . . . , T are decreasing and convex.
An optimal lot sizing O(T 2 ) procedure with a given number of orders
In this Subsection, we develop an O(T 2 )-procedure to compute the values F i n (T ) : n = 1, . . . , T , defined in (11) , and needed in the evaluation of (12) . The procedure computes all entries of the ma-
. . , T , row by row, starting with the values F i 1 (t) : t = 1, . . . , T in the first row. Recall that F i n (T ) denotes the minimal cost in a dynamic lot sizing problem in which exactly n orders are to be placed. To simplify the expressions we drop the superscripts in this subsection. We first need the following notation: 
h k = the cost of carrying a unit of in stock from period 1 until the beginning of period t + 1 = H(t − 1) + h t S(k, t) = the total inventory carrying cost in periods k, k + 1, . . . , t when placing an order in period k to meet the cumulative demand in periods k, . . . , t.
is the additional cost of procuring a unit in period l as opposed to procuring it in the earlier period k and keeping it in stock until period l.)
Note that the first row of the matrix F , i.e. the values {F 1 (t) : t = 1, . . . , T } are easily obtained in O(T ) time from the recursion:
Assume therefore that the first (n − 1) rows of F have been calculated. We now show how the n−th row can be determined in O(T )-time by a 'list-based' procedure, similar to that in Federgruen and Tzur (1991) for the unrestricted lot sizing problem. To this end, let for all t = 1, . . . , T :
F n (l, t) = the minimum cost in periods 1, . . . , t, under exactly n orders, when period l is the last order period preceding period t.
To decide whether for a given horizon t, some period l is a better 'last' order period than some
and note:
Subtracting (24) from (25), we obtain after some algebra that (27) Thus, the difference function Δ n,k,l (t) depends on the cost and demand parameters in the periods l + 1, . . . , t only via the single characteristic B(t), i.e. the cumulative demand factor in periods 1, . . . , t. Moreover the difference function is an affine function of B(t), with A n (k, l) its intercept.
Furthermore, it is easy to characterize for which values B(t), k dominates l as a last order period.
Consider the following two cases:
The condition is equivalent to c k,l ≤ c k ; in this case, it is never strictly better to use l as the last order period rather than an earlier period. To show this, consider an optimal ZIO plan for some planning horizon t ≥ l, with l as the last order period. Since c k,l ≤ c l , costs do not increase when placing the order in the earlier period k. The resulting policy may fail to be a ZIO policy but via a series of perturbations it can be transformed into a ZIO policy of equal or lower cost with the same set of order periods, i.e. with a period before l as the last order period.
(II)C(k) >C(l): In this case, it follows from (26) that l is a strictly better last order period than k if and only if
Since each of the values in {F n (t) : t = 1, . . . , T } represents the cost of a ZIO policy, these values are completely characterized by determining for all t = 1, . . . , T :
l n (t) = the optimal last order period for the time interval [1, t] , when the total number of orders in this interval must equal n, i.e.
(If more than one period qualifies as an optimal last order period, define l n (t) as the smallest such period). Clearly F n (t) = ∞, if t < n, so we can restrict ourselves to the case where t ≥ n. Clearly, the list {l n (j) : j = 1, . . . , T } of actual optimal last order periods is simply the list of the first elements of the respective lists
The following Algorithm summarizes the full procedure to determine the complete matrix 
8: end for 9: for n = 2, 1, T do 10: for j = 1, 1, n − 1 do (1, 1) via (28) ). We conclude that the Algorithm requires O(T 2 ) operations.
The following lemma identifies an effective way to 'update' the lists {L n (j) :
Clearly, L n (n) = {n} with r(n) = B(n).
(c) The periods appear in the list L n (j) in descending order of theirC values, i.e.
) and the critical values r(1), . . . , r(m)
remain unchanged as well. 
The firms face a planning horizon of T = 54 periods. We consider six different seasonality patterns {β t : t = 1, . . . , 54}, which satisfy (2) and are common to all three firms, as follows: Observe that the F n (54)-values are significantly different across the six patterns, for small numbers of permitted setup periods, but the relative difference gradually decreases as n increases. Since the parameters c i t parameters are constant over time, the variable procurement cost component in {F n (54)} is identical for all n = 1, . . . , 54 and for all seasonality patterns (I)-(VI). All differences in the {F n (54)} values are therefore attributable to differences in the holding costs. These, of course, decline to zero as n increases to 54. For all n ≥ 7, the cyclical pattern (VI) is the least expensive to service and the time-invariant pattern (I) the most expensive. This contradicts common folklore which assumes that optimal costs are achieved when one is facing a smooth, time-invariant sales pattern. 
for appropriate constants η i , ζ i > 0 and 0 < γ i < 2. For example, these constants can be chosen to minimize the sum of squared differences between the left and the right sides of (36). Table 1 below exhibits the parameters generating the best possible fit:
The last column in Table 1 displays, for the six patterns, the average relative difference between the exact and the approximate curve. We have found that approximations of the type (36) are, in fact, very close, across the board, for any combination of cost values and seasonality patterns.
We now turn to the best response problem firm 1 faces when both of his competitors choose a price value of $30. Based on (14) and (15), Figure 2 exhibits the optimal profit π * 1 (n) for pattern At the price vector p = {30, 30, 30}, this set of demand functions has the same direct price it is optimal to place an order in every period under both patterns.)
The Equilibrium Analysis
In this §, we analyze the equilibrium behavior in the industry under price-or Bertrand competition.
(See however, the end of this section for a discussion of the case of Cournot competition.) As in §3, we assume, here, that the fixed order costs are constant throughout the planning horizon. in the profit function (18), we obtain:
where, with c i = min t=1,... ,T c i t , i = 1, . . . , N:
A sufficient condition for the existence of a price equilibrium is the well-known Nash-Debreu condition:
While the revenue term in (38) is concave in p i , the cost term is (piecewise linear) concave, as well, adding a convex term to the profit function. Below we identify an intuitive condition which guarantees that the concavity of the revenue term 'dominates' the convexity effect of the cost function. As the condition relates the price elasticity to the turnover rate, i.e. the sales to inventory ratio, we proceed to show that it is almost invariably satisfied.
Since the cost function in (38) is a piecewise linear concave function of the deseasonalized demand volume, it is difficult to use this representation to verify when condition (C) is satisfied.
However, the following provides a very close approximation of this cost function via a single closed form differentiable function:
By Theorem 1,F i n (T ) is convex and decreasing in n. Let Φ i (x) be a convex and differentiable extension of the {F i n (T ) : n = 1, 2, . . . } curve, i.e. Φ i (n) =F i n (T ) for all n = 1, 2, . . . . The following is, therefore, a close upper bound approximation of the profit function π i :
where
(u). Convexity of this function can be verified directly by inspecting the sign of δ 2πi (p)/(∂p i ) 2 . An alternative approximation is obtained by replacingF i n (T ) by a function of the form (36) and treating n as a continuous variable:
The convex minimization problem to the right of (42) can be solved in closed form by setting the first derivative of the minimand equal to zero. After some algebra this results in:
where Theorem 2 below shows that a Nash equilibrium exists in the price competition model if the following easily interpretable condition is satisfied:
The proof of Theorem 2 shows that (C1) is in fact equivalent to (C), i. e. to the overall profit While condition (C1) guarantees that a Nash equilibrium exists, two important questions remain: (a) Is the Nash equilibrium unique or can multiple equilibria arise, making it hard to predict which of the possible equilibria the industry will adopt and (b) How can the equilibrium (or equilibria) be computed efficiently? We show that under a slight tightening of condition (C1), a unique equilibrium can indeed be guaranteed and that this unique equilibrium can be efficiently computed as the limit point of the following simple (iterative) tatônnement scheme:
Tatônnement scheme: Starting with an arbitrary price vector p (0) , in the k-th iteration of the scheme, each firm determines the price p i (k) which solves the best response problem (8) , assuming all competing firms' prices are set according to their value in the price vector p (k−1) .
Convergence of this tatônnement scheme is guaranteed when the game is supermodular. The proof of Theorem 2(b) shows that the supermodularity property is equivalent to a condition, closely related to (C1):
As reviewed above, condition (C2), which is somewhat tighter than (C1), is still very comfortably satisfied for virtually all product lines.
Theorem 2 Assume the deseasonalized demand functions {δ i (p)} are linear, i.e. they satisfy (3),
while all fixed order costs are constant throughout time, i.e. 
Consider the price competition game under the (approximate) profit functionsπ
i (p) in (43).
Proof: (a) Note that
Condition (C) for the existence of a Nash equilibrium is satisfied if and only if
x achieves its minimum value of 2 for x = 1.
(b) For the tatônnement scheme to converge to a Nash equilibrium, it suffices to show that the profit functionπ i is supermodular in (p i , p j ) for all i = j, i.e. that
But, following the algebra in part (a), this inequality is equivalent to ii ≤ [γ i + 2 +
as shown in part (a). Finally, to show that the equilibrium is unique, it suffices to verify that
But j =i Consider now the case where the firms engage in Cournot (quantity) competition as opposed to Bertrand (price) competition. Consider, again, the conditions stated in Theorem 1, and assume the approximate profit functionsπ i (·) in (43) are used. Under (3), the system of (deseasonalized) demand functions can be inverted resulting in the inverse demand functions:
It follows from a straightforward generalization of Theorem 3 in Bernstein and Federgruen (2003) that an equilibrium exists under condition (C1) and that this equilibrium is unique under (C2) and the condition
the direct counterpart of (4) for inverse demand functions. Thus, the same condition (C1) guarantees an equilibrium both under price-and under quantity competition. Moreover, an analogous pair of conditions guarantees that the equilibrium is unique. However, in contrast to the case of price competition, it is no longer possible to ensure that the tatônnement scheme converges to an equilibrium, even when a unique equilibrium can be guaranteed.
Numerical Examples
In this §, we report on a numerical study conducted to investigate the effect on the equilibrium behavior of seasonality patterns and economies of scale resulting from fixed setup costs. Table 2 induces it, in all 24 problem instances considered, to adopt a lower price than his competitors, the 
withstanding. While the differences in the price equilibria are relatively small, they often have very significant impacts on equilibrium volumes and in particular equilibrium profits. For example, when K i t = 4000, firm 1's profit is nearly 25% larger under the cyclic seasonality pattern (VI) than under constant demands (I). When K 1 t = 5400 firm 1 more than doubles its profit when moving from the constant demand pattern (I) to a pattern with a holiday season at the beginning (IV). The profit increases for firm 2 and 3, when moving from (I) to (IV), are in absolute terms, approximately equal to that experienced by firm 1, even though in relative terms they amount to an increase of approximately 16%.
It is hard to predict which seasonality pattern results in higher equilibrium prices: for K 1 t = 500, the prices under the constant pattern (I) are lower than those under the cyclic pattern (VI) but the opposite is true for K i t = 4000. Note, also, that the impact of a fixed order cost increase on the equilibrium prices may vary rather significantly depending on which of the seasonality patterns prevails. For example, when K increases from 500 to 1000, equilibrium prices increase by $1.26 for . We conclude that the seasonality patterns of the demand functions (as well as the cost parameters) may result in significant differences in the equilibria. Sometimes, the seasonality pattern determines whether a unique equilibrium, no equilibrium or multiple equilibria prevail. The latter two cases arise, of course, in settings where conditions (C) and (C2) are violated.
Finally, Table 3 below exhibits the equilibria in Example 4 with K = 5000. In this case, the seasonality pattern has a significantly larger impact on the equilibrium prices; for example, that of firm 1 decreases by $6 when going from pattern (I) to (IV). While firm 1 generally positions itself at a lower price than its competitors, the reverse is true under pattern (I).
A generalized model
In our base model, the time-dependence of the demand functions is expressed by multiplicative seasonality factors only, as in (3), and the fixed costs are constant over time. We have shown that in this base model the optimal sequence of order periods, given a total number of orders is independent of the prices charged by the firms, see (9) and (10).
This decomposability breaks down when the fixed order costs are time-dependent or the demand functions' time-dependence is more general, e.g. when there are additive seasonality terms: However, thanks to the availability of the best response algorithm of van den Heuvel and Wagelmans (2004), the tatônnement scheme can still be applied effectively to the fully general model. When convergent, its limit point is, of course, a Nash equilibrium. If convergent to the same limit point, regardless of its starting point p (0) , the equilibrium is in fact unique. Thus, the tatônnement scheme provides an algorithmic mechanism to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in any given instance of the general model. Indeed, we have applied the scheme to a large variety of problem instances of the general model and have found that a unique equilibrium exists in the vast majority of cases.
To illustrate this, we analyze a set of six problem instances with additive rather than multiplicative seasonality factors for the demand function, i.e. β i t = 1. The six instances are obtained from the base case in Example 2 (where all α i t = 0), merely by varying the α i t terms. The seasonality patterns are the direct analog of (I)-(VI) in the case of multiplicative seasonalities.
For each pattern, we obtain the α i t -terms from the β i t -factors for the same pattern, employing the transformation α i t = 100(β i t − 1). (Note that 1 54 54 t=1 α i t = 0 ∀i.) Table 4 displays the equilibrium prices, demand values, profits and number of setups for the 6 instances. As in the case of multiplicative seasonalities, we note that the differences in the equilibrium prices are modest.
At the same time, major differences in the number of setup periods may arise, translating into equilibrium profit differences of up to 8.4%. The differences become even larger when the setup cost parameters K i t are increased, see Table 4 . As in the case of multiple seasonalities, all firms may be better off under seasonally varying demands or cost parameters, once again contradicting common folklore. 
Conclusions
We have developed the first oligopoly model combining (I) the complexity of time-varying demand and cost functions with (II) that of scale economies due to dynamic lot sizing costs. When the firms engage in price competition, we have identified general sufficient conditions under which a Nash equilibrium exists, under which this Nash equilibrium is unique and under which a simple tatônnement scheme is guaranteed to converge to the equilibrium. In this scheme, firms repeatedly solve their best response problem, i.e. each firm determines the best combined price and dynamic In the absence of fixed order costs, the demand in any given period t is optimally procured in a period s ≤ t for which the total procurement cost rate (= order cost rate plus holding costs, if any) is lowest, irrespective of the demand values and hence irrespective of the prices charged by the firms. As a consequence, the minimum total procurement cost for firm i is proportional to δ i (p), its deseasonalized demand volume. Thus, in the absence of fixed order costs, the oligopoly model reduces to the standard price competition model in economics. Since the cost function is linear in δ i (p), the profit function π i (p) is concave in p i if and only if the gross revenue function is concave in p i ; see Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for a list of various classes of demand functions for which this is the case, so that a Nash equilibrium exists, see (C).
Our model assumes that prices remain constant throughout the planning horizon and we have argued in §1 why this assumption is often satisfied. The above not withstanding, we hope that our work will be extended to allow for a limited or an arbitrary number of price changes.
